The audience effect and the role of deception in the expression of male mating preferences by Castellano, Sergio et al.
1 
 
The audience effect and the role of deception in the expression of male mating preferences 1 
Sergio Castellano
a
, Olivier Friard
a
 Andrea Pilastro
b,*
 2 
a
 Dipartimento di Scienze della Vita e Biologia dei Sistemi, Università di Torino, Torino, Italy 3 
b
 Dipartimento di Biologia, Università di Padova, Padova, Italy 4 
   5 
Received 2 November 2015 6 
Initial acceptance 16 December 2015 7 
Final acceptance 27 January 2016 8 
MS. number: 15-00932R 9 
 10 
*
Correspondence: A. Pilastro, Università di Padova, Dipartimento di Biologia, via Ugo bassi 11 
51/B, I-35131 Padova, Italy. 12 
E-mail address: andrea.pilastro@unipd.it  13 
 14 
Males of several species have been shown to alter their mate preference in the presence of an 15 
eavesdropping rival. This evasive tactic has been interpreted as an attempt by the courting 16 
male to drive the attention of the rival away from the preferred female. The fitness return of 17 
this deceptive strategy will depend on the costs of cheating for the actor (the displayer) and 18 
the benefits for the rival (the bystander) of copying the choice of the displayer. We developed 19 
a two-person nonzero sum game between two males that compete for mating with one of two 20 
receptive females. Males could assess female quality with a varying level of uncertainty, 21 
which was modelled using a Bayesian statistical decision theory approach. We explored the 22 
actor and bystander payoffs under different levels of uncertainty in mate assessment and 23 
difference in quality between females. We found that when being eavesdropped on is costly 24 
(i.e. when females differ largely in quality), males are expected to cheat to reduce the amount 25 
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of public information that is available to the unintended audience. However, under these 26 
circumstances, the value of the public information is low and the bystander is not expected to 27 
copy the choice of the actor. Our model suggests that deceptive male choice may evolve only 28 
under relatively restricted conditions and suggest that other explanations, such as, for 29 
example, a reduction in the risk of precopulatory male–male competition may be more likely. 30 
Future theoretical and empirical work will be necessary to test alternative interpretations of 31 
the audience effects in male mate choice.   32 
Keywords: audience effects; computational mate choice; deception; game-theoretic model; 33 
male mate choice; mate choice copying; Poecilia; public information; sperm competition.  34 
  35 
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Animals can improve their assessment of the quality of conspecifics or environmental 36 
resources by using public information. This is a form of ‘inadvertent social information’ 37 
(Dall, Giraldeau, Olsson, McNamara, & Stephens, 2005) that can be acquired by noting the 38 
performance of other individuals or their behavioural decisions (Valone, 1989; Valone, 2007). 39 
Evidence for the acquisition of public information from the behavioural decisions of others 40 
comes mostly from studies of female mate copying behaviour (Dugatkin, 1992; Dugatkin & 41 
Godin, 1992; Nordell & Valone, 1998; Pruett-Jones, 1992). Mate choice copying occurs when 42 
an individual’s initial mating preference between two potential partners is reversed after 43 
having witnessed another individual displaying a preference for the initially nonpreferred 44 
partner (Dugatkin & Godin, 1992; Santos, Matos, & Varela, 2014). Mate choice copying was 45 
first found in the guppy, Poecilia reticulata (e.g. Dugatkin, 1992). Since then it has been 46 
reported in several vertebrate (Galef, Lim, & Gilbert, 2008; Galef & White, 1998; Gibson, 47 
Bradbury, & Vehrencamp, 1991; Hoglund, Alatalo, Gibson, & Lundberg, 1995) and 48 
invertebrate species (Loyau, Blanchet, Van Laere, Clobert, & Danchin, 2012; Mery et al., 49 
2009). It is typically observed in females (Dugatkin, 1996a; Vakirtzis, 2011; Westneat, 50 
Walters, McCarthy, Hatch, & Hein, 2000) and can be so strong that it overrides females’ 51 
innate preferences (Dugatkin, 1996b, 1998; Godin, Herdman, & Dugatkin, 2005; Witte & 52 
Noltemeier, 2002). Females may benefit from copying because this reduces their sampling 53 
time (Witte & Nöbel, 2011) and their choice error, in particular when they are inexperienced 54 
in mate choice (Dugatkin & Godin, 1993). Furthermore, male displays are often conspicuous 55 
to predators and predation risk associated with mate evaluation (Gibson & Bachman, 1992; 56 
Pocklington & Dill, 1995) may therefore be reduced if, by copying, females can avoid being 57 
directly courted before mating and mate when predation risk is reduced. Indeed, female sailfin 58 
mollies, Poecilia latipinna, remember males and can copy the mate choice of other females 59 
up to 1 day after they have observed their sexual interaction (Witte & Massmann, 2003).  60 
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 61 
The evolutionary scenario for mate choice copying is more complicated in the case of males. 62 
Although mate choice copying has also been reported for males, in particular in fishes 63 
(Frommen, Rahn, Schroth, Waltschyk, & Bakker, 2009; Schlupp & Ryan, 1997; Widemo, 64 
2006; Witte & Ryan, 2002), the benefits of this mating strategy for males are less clear. It has 65 
been suggested that such benefits may be associated with male mate-searching behaviour in 66 
species that court within communication networks (Webster & Laland, 2013). For example, 67 
males seeking mates have been shown to eavesdrop on conspicuous courtship behaviour of 68 
rival males to locate mates (e.g. Clark, Roberts, & Uetz, 2012; Grafe, 2005; Milner, 69 
Booksmythe, Jennions, & Backwell, 2010; Webster & Laland, 2013) and fertility status of 70 
females (Schlupp & Ryan 1997). Furthermore, males may observe other males’ courtship 71 
behaviour to indirectly assess the relative quality of different mates, for example to locate 72 
higher quality females if male courtship rate varies with the quality of the available mates 73 
(Ojanguren & Magurran, 2004). However, when a male can choose between two different 74 
females, copying the choice of another male may be associated with nontrivial costs. 75 
Typically, mate choice copying is accompanied by an increased risk of directly or indirectly 76 
competing with the male whose choice has been copied (Witte, Kniel, & Kureck, 2015). 77 
Accordingly, mate choice copying is less frequent in the sex in which mate competition is 78 
stronger (see Kniel et al., 2015; Widemo, 2006 for a reversed sex role species and for a 79 
species with traditional sex roles, respectively). Intrasexual competition deriving from mate 80 
choice copying can occur before and after mating. In monandrous species, a male copying the 81 
mate choice of another male will face an increased risk of losing the contest with the rival 82 
and/or of being rejected by the female. When females are polyandrous, choosing another 83 
male’s previous mate will result in an increased level of sperm competition (Nöbel & Witte, 84 
2013). Furthermore, the cost of being rejected by the female cannot be discounted, as even in 85 
5 
 
polyandrous species a female’s mating probability is expected to decrease as the number of 86 
previous matings increases. For example, in an experiment with guppies, only 64% of 55 87 
females that mated with one male and were presented with a second male after the initial 88 
mating did actually remate (Evans & Magurran, 2001). Assuming that this remating 89 
probability remains constant across successive encounters with males, about 29% of the 90 
females would be expected to mate with more than five males. This figure is very similar to 91 
the proportion observed in another guppy population, using a slightly different mating design, 92 
in which about 26% of the females mated with more than five males (frequency estimated 93 
from Figure 2 in Evans & Gasparini, 2013), supporting the generally assumed notion that 94 
guppy female mating rate declines with the number of previous matings. The decline in 95 
female mating probability after mating may be due to increased costs and/or decreased 96 
benefits of successive matings (Jennions & Petrie, 2000) or to conflict with males (e.g. Scott, 97 
1986). 98 
 99 
The costs of being copied also differ between males and females. A male whose choice is 100 
copied will suffer the same costs, associated with the increased probability of pre- and 101 
postcopulatory competition, faced by the copier. Accordingly, male sexual behaviour is often 102 
altered by the presence of a bystander (e.g. Vignal, Mathevon, & Mottin, 2004) and the public 103 
information extracted from intersexual communication can be used to guide the behaviour of 104 
eavesdropping individuals (Matos & Schlupp, 2005). Audience effects in a male choice 105 
context have been studied in detail in fish (Dzieweczynski & Rowland, 2004; Herb, Biron, & 106 
Kidd, 2003), and in particular in poeciliids (Auld & Godin, 2015; Fisher & Rosenthal, 2007; 107 
Makowicz, Plath, & Schlupp, 2010; Plath, Blum, Schlupp, & Tiedemann, 2008; Plath, 108 
Richter, Tiedemann, & Schlupp, 2008). In these fish, it has been shown that the initial 109 
preference of the focal male between two potential female partners is attenuated or even 110 
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reversed when he is observed by a competitor male (Plath, Blum, et al., 2008; Plath, Richter, 111 
et al., 2008; Ziege et al., 2009). This behaviour has been interpreted as an attempt by the focal 112 
male to deceive the audience male about his real mating preference: if the audience male 113 
copies the focal male’s mate choice (Auld & Godin, 2015), the latter will reduce the risk of 114 
sperm competition when later mating with the initially preferred female ('deception 115 
hypothesis', Bierbach et al., 2013; Plath, Richter, et al., 2008).  116 
 117 
The deception hypothesis rests on the assumption that the costs of deceiving are smaller than 118 
its benefits. Costs and benefits for the deceiving male will depend on the response of the 119 
bystander to his deceptive signals. In turn, the response of the bystander will depend on the 120 
costs or benefits that the bystander is expected to obtain if he uses the focal-male mating 121 
preferences as a source of public information about the qualities of prospective female mates. 122 
Benefits of copying for the bystander are expected to vary in relation to (1) the difference in 123 
quality between two potential female mates; in particular, a bystander male should be able to 124 
make an independent mate quality assessment when the difference in quality between two 125 
potential mates is large (Witte & Ryan, 1998); (2) the probability that a female will remate 126 
after having mated with another male; in particular it can be expected that this probability is 127 
always <1, otherwise a female will remate indefinitely (Evans & Gasparini, 2013); (3) the 128 
fertilization success in relation to mating order; unless there is a significant last male 129 
precedence effect, mate choice copying should not evolve.  130 
 131 
To investigate the hypothesis that audience-mediated flexibility in male mating preferences 132 
evolved to deceive potential competitors about the quality of prospective females, we 133 
developed a game-theoretic model between two players: a focal male (the actor) and an 134 
observer (the bystander). The actor has the priority in mating decisions and can strategically 135 
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control his manifested preferences for a high- over a low-quality female. The observer can 136 
eavesdrop on the actor’s mating behaviour and strategically use (or decide not to use) this 137 
public information in mating decisions.  138 
 139 
<H1>Methods 140 
<H2>The model 141 
The game is a two-person nonzero sum game between two males that compete for mating 142 
with one of two receptive females. The two males are of similar quality, but play different 143 
roles: the actor has the priority of choosing and, eventually, of mating with one of the two 144 
females; the bystander can observe the behaviour of the actor and, only after the actor has 145 
made his move, he can make his own. To provide the actor with the possibility of cheating, 146 
the model assumes that the bystander can assess the mating preferences, but not the mate 147 
choice of the actor (see below). Unlike males, females are assumed to differ in quality (e.g. 148 
the number or dimensions of eggs). We name the high-quality female H and the low-quality 149 
female L.  150 
 151 
<H2>The Actor strategy: the use of private information 152 
The actor assesses the females’ quality with uncertainty. To model this, we adopt a Bayesian 153 
statistical decision theory approach (McNamara & Dall, 2010). We describe the perceived 154 
female values with one of two stochastic variables:  (1) 𝐻 = 𝜇𝐻 + 𝜀, when the female is of 155 
high quality and (2) 𝐿 = 𝜇𝐿 + 𝜀, when she is of low quality. 𝜇𝐻 and 𝜇𝐿 (with 𝜇𝐻 > 𝜇𝐿) are the 156 
true female qualities, whereas 𝜀 is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and 157 
variance 𝜎2. We define ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑥|𝐻) and 𝑙(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑥|𝐿) the probability density functions 158 
of  H and L, respectively.  159 
 160 
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First, we consider the behaviour of the actor when the bystander is absent. Suppose that, at a 161 
given time i, the actor is assessing the high-quality female, which he perceives of quality 𝑥𝑖. 162 
The actor has no prior information, but he is assumed to ‘know’ the likelihoods of perceiving 163 
𝑥𝑖 when a female is either of high or of low quality and to be able to ‘compute’ the relative 164 
posterior probability:  165 
 166 
𝑃(𝐻|𝑥𝑖) =
ℎ(𝑥𝑖)
ℎ(𝑥𝑖)+𝑙(𝑥𝑖)
.         (1) 167 
 168 
If 𝑃(𝐻|𝑥𝑖) > 0.5 then the male will court the female until time i+1; otherwise he will move to 169 
and start courting the other female. Note that, at any time step i, the posterior probabilities are 170 
assumed to be independent of previous assessments, that is, the male is thought not to use 171 
prior private information. 172 
 173 
The proportion of time spent by the actor with the high-quality female is the expression of his 174 
preference. Since 𝑃(𝐻|𝑥𝑖) > 0.5 when 𝑥𝑖 >
1
2
(𝜇𝐻 + 𝜇𝐿), (see Fig. 1a,c), the actor’s perceived 175 
preference for the high-quality female is: 176 
 177 
𝐴𝐻 = ∫ ℎ(𝑥)
∞
𝜇𝐻+𝜇𝐿
2
𝑑𝑥.        (2) 178 
 179 
Analogously, 𝐴𝐿 = 1 −  𝐴𝐻, is the preference for the low-quality female.   180 
Second, we consider what happens when the actor perceives the presence of the bystander. 181 
We assume that the bystander does not affect the perceived preferences (𝐴𝐻) of the actor, but 182 
only his manifested preferences (𝑀𝐻). In other words, we allow the actor to cheat. This means 183 
that, when there is a bystander, the actor can move away from a female even if he perceives 184 
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her of high quality or he can court a female even if he perceives her of low quality. 185 
Specifically, we assume that the manifested preferences for the high- and low-quality females 186 
are, respectively, 𝑀𝐻 = (1 − 𝐾𝐴)𝐴𝐻 , and 𝑀𝐿 = 1 − 𝑀𝐻 = 𝐾𝐴 + (1 − 𝐾𝐴)𝐴𝐿. 187 
 188 
𝐾𝐴 can vary between 0 and 1 and it describes the strategy of the actor. When 𝐾𝐴 is zero, the 189 
actor adopts a honest strategy and the perceived and the manifested preferences coincide. 190 
Conversely, when 𝐾𝐴 = 1, the actor is fully dishonest in that he will court the female he 191 
perceives of low quality. 192 
 193 
<H2>The Bystander’s strategy: the use of public information 194 
When waiting for his turn, the bystander obtains the females’ quality information both 195 
directly, by assessing them, and indirectly, by eavesdropping on the actor’s behaviour. Thus, 196 
when he eventually has access to the females, he is assumed to make an optimal use of the 197 
previously acquired public information, as predicted by Bayes’s theorem. The posterior 198 
probability of the hypothesis that the assessed female is of better quality than the other (i.e. 199 
the probability that she is the H female) will depend not only on her perceived quality (𝑥𝑖), 200 
but also on her prior probability 𝑃(𝐻) that this hypothesis be true:  201 
 202 
𝑃(𝐻|𝑥𝑖) =
ℎ(𝑥𝑖)𝑃(𝐻)
ℎ(𝑥𝑖)𝑃(𝐻)+𝑙(𝑥𝑖)𝑃(𝐿)
.        (3) 203 
 204 
The prior probability depends on how the bystander evaluates and responds to the manifested 205 
preference of the actor. Specifically, we assume that the bystander’s strategy is defined by 206 
two variables: (1) 𝐾𝐵, which depends on the assumed reliability of the actor’s manifested 207 
preference and affects the amount of public information that is actually used in the decision 208 
process; (2) b, a binary variable which describes the way the bystander uses public 209 
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information: when 𝑏 = 1, the actor’s manifested preferences and 𝑃(𝐻) are positively 210 
associated, whereas when 𝑏 = 0, they are negatively associated: 211 
  212 
𝑃(𝐻) = {
𝑖𝑓 𝑏 = 0 then (1 − 𝑀𝐻
𝐾𝐵 (
1
2
)
1−𝐾𝐵
)
𝑖𝑓 𝑏 = 1 then 𝑀𝐻
𝐾𝐵 (
1
2
)
1−𝐾𝐵
    
      (4) 213 
 214 
When 𝐾B = 0, the bystander perceives the public information as fully unreliable and P(𝐻) =215 
0.5, independent of the value of b. When 𝐾B = 1, the bystander perceives the public 216 
information as fully reliable. In this case, if b = 0 then 𝑃(𝐻) = 𝑀𝐻, whereas if b = 1 then 217 
𝑃(𝐻) = 1 − 𝑀𝐻. The bystander, by strategically adjusting 𝐾𝐵 between 0 and 1, can control 218 
the risk of being deceived by the actor, whereas, by controlling b, he can increase or decrease 219 
the probability of mating with the female preferred by the actor. As we shall see, b plays an 220 
important role in determining the bystander’s optimal decision strategy, when unmated 221 
females should be preferred over recently mated females, independent of their qualities. 222 
 223 
As for the actor, we assume that the proportion of time spent by the bystander with a female is 224 
the probability of obtaining 𝑃(𝐻|𝑥) > 0.5 when assessing that female and it is an expression 225 
of his preference. It may be shown that 𝑃(𝐻|𝑥) > 0.5 when the perceived quality is greater 226 
than the threshold , which depends not only on 𝜇𝐻 and 𝜇𝐿, but also on the uncertainty level 227 
𝜎2 and on the log (
𝑃(𝐿)
𝑃(𝐻)
) (see Fig. 1b, d for a graphical representation and the Appendix for an 228 
analytical derivation of ). Thus, the bystander’s preference for H is: 229 
 230 
𝐵𝐻 = ∫ ℎ(𝑥)
∞

𝑑𝑥;         (5a) 231 
and his preference for L is: 232 
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𝐵𝐿 = 1 − 𝐵𝐻.           (5b) 233 
 234 
<H2>Payoffs 235 
As mentioned above, 𝜇𝐻 and 𝜇𝐿 are the reproductive resources (i.e. the number of eggs) made 236 
available by the high- and the low-quality females. Let 𝜋𝐴 = 𝑓(𝐾𝐴) and 𝜋𝐵 = 𝑓(𝐾𝐵, 𝑏) the 237 
strategies of the actor and of the bystander, respectively. We define the payoffs 𝑊(𝜋𝐴, 𝜋𝐵) as 238 
the amount of reproductive resources that the actor is expected to obtain when playing 𝜋𝐴 239 
against the bystander playing 𝜋𝐵. Conversely, 𝑊(𝜋𝐵, 𝜋𝐴) are the payoffs of the bystander 240 
playing 𝜋𝐵 against an actor playing 𝜋𝐴. Besides the total amount of resources (𝜇𝐻 and 𝜇𝐿), 241 
three other parameters affect the payoffs matrix: (1) the costs of cheating (); (2) the 242 
probability that a female that has mated with the actor will mate again with the bystander (); 243 
(3) the effect of mating order on fertilization success (). 244 
 245 
The costs of cheating paid by the actor are represented by his decreased probability of mating 246 
with the high-quality female. For fully honest actors, the model assumes that the probability 247 
of mating with either the high- or the low-quality female is, respectively, 𝑀𝐻 and 𝑀𝐿. When 248 
the actor is cheating (that is, when 𝑀𝐻 < 𝐴𝐻), he is expected to experience a reduced 249 
probability of mating with H, which is not compensated for by an increase in the probability 250 
of mating with L. Specifically, we assume that his probability of mating with H is 𝐴𝐻(1 −251 
𝐾𝐴)
𝛾, where  is the parameter defining the cost of cheating. The probability of mating with L 252 
is still 𝑀𝐿.  253 
 254 
For the bystander, mating probability depends on his preferences and on whether the chosen 255 
female has previously mated with the actor. We assume that recently mated females are less 256 
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prone to remate and the parameter  defines the probability that a mated female will remate 257 
(0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1). 258 
 259 
When both males mate with the same female, sperm competition occurs. In this case, we 260 
assume that between-male differences in fertilization success depend only on the mating order 261 
and we define with  (with 0 ≤  ≤ 1) the proportion of eggs that are expected to be 262 
fertilized by the bystander (i.e. by the second of the two males to mate with the female). 263 
 264 
We define the payoffs matrices of the (𝜋𝐴, 𝜋𝐵) game as: 265 
 266 
𝑊(𝜋𝐴, 𝜋𝐵) = 𝜇𝐻𝐴𝐻(1 − 𝐾𝐴)
𝛾(1 − 𝛿𝜑𝐵𝐻) + 𝜇𝐿𝐴𝐿(1 − 𝛿𝜑𝐵𝐿)     (6a) 267 
 268 
and  269 
 270 
𝑊(𝜋𝐵, 𝜋𝐴) = 𝜇𝐻𝐵𝐻(1 − 𝐴𝐻(1 − 𝐾𝐴)
𝛾(1 − 𝛿𝜑)) + 𝜇𝐿𝐵𝐿(1 − 𝐴𝐿(1 − 𝛿𝜑)).  (6b) 271 
 272 
In words, the expected benefits of the actor are the sum of two terms: (1) the resources (𝜇𝐻) 273 
expected from the high-quality female, H, multiplied by the probabilities that the actor mates 274 
with H and the bystander chooses either L or H, corrected for the bystander’s probability of 275 
mating or siring her eggs, and (2) the resources (𝜇𝐿) expected from the low-quality female, L, 276 
multiplied by the probabilities that the actor mates with H and the bystander chooses either H 277 
or L, corrected for the bystander’s probability of mating or siring her eggs. Analogously, the 278 
payoffs of the bystander are the sum of the expected resources obtained from the high- and 279 
the low-quality females multiplied by the probabilities that he mates with them and fertilizes 280 
their eggs.  281 
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 282 
<H2>Solutions of the game 283 
To solve this game, we transformed the variables 𝐾𝐴 and 𝐾𝐵 from continuous to discrete, by 284 
letting them assume n equidistant values between 0 and 1 (extremes included). A strategy is 285 
represented by the discrete probability distributions of the variables that define it: the actor’s 286 
strategy is a vector of n elements, whereas the bystander’s strategy is a matrix with 2n 287 
elements. The discrete game was obtained by evaluating the actor’s and bystander’s payoffs at 288 
the 2𝑛2 points. From the payoff matrix, we derive the Nash equilibrium pairs, that is, pairs of 289 
strategies (𝜋𝐴
∗ , 𝜋𝐵
∗ ) that satisfy the conditions 𝑊𝐴(𝜋𝐴, 𝜋𝐵
∗ ) ≤ 𝑊𝐴(𝜋𝐴
∗ , 𝜋𝐵
∗ ) and 𝑊𝐵(𝜋𝐴
∗ , 𝜋𝐵) ≤290 
𝑊𝐵(𝜋𝐴
∗ , 𝜋𝐵
∗ ). A pure equilibrium pair occurs when both the actor and the bystander play only 291 
one tactic. Conversely, a mixed equilibrium pair occurs when the actor’s and bystander’s 292 
optimal strategies involve several tactics with different probabilities. In both pure and mixed 293 
equilibrium strategies, the level of the actor’s honesty and bystander’s perceived reliability 294 
can be described, respectively, by ?̅?𝐴
∗ = ∑ 𝜋𝐴
∗𝑛
𝑖 (𝑖)𝐾𝐴(𝑖) and ?̅?𝐵
∗ = ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝐵
∗2
𝑗=1 (𝑖, 𝑗)𝐾𝐵(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  295 
 296 
To find mixed equilibrium pairs, we used the bimat.m function (Bapi Chatterjee 2009), which 297 
finds one mixed Nash equilibrium strategy, using the quadratic-programming method of 298 
Mangasarian and Stone (1964). A full description of the model, a downloadable version of the 299 
Python notebook and the user manual can be found at http://penelope.unito.it/matecopying. 300 
 301 
<H1>Results 302 
<H2>Uncertainty and deception 303 
In our model, we assume that the mechanism of mating decision is analogous to the 304 
computation of the posterior probability that a prospective mate is an appropriate partner. The 305 
bystander, thus, is assumed to use direct evidence (i.e. private information from directly 306 
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assessing female quality) and priors (i.e. public information obtained by observing the actor’s 307 
mating preferences) optimally, as described by Bayes’s principle. From this assumption, it 308 
follows that the influence of the public information on the bystander’s choice depends on the 309 
accuracy of direct assessment. If the bystander obtains strong direct evidence that a female is 310 
of high quality, then the public information (the priors) plays only a marginal role on his final 311 
mating decision. In contrast, when he cannot assess the female with high accuracy, his mating 312 
decision may be strongly affected by eavesdropping on the actor. Since the actor can control 313 
the type and the amount of (public) information that is available to the bystander, his 314 
deceiving possibilities are expected to increase with decreasing assessment accuracy. For 315 
example, when the direct assessment is accurate and the actor perceives a 0.75, but shows a 316 
0.375 preference for the high-quality female (i.e. 𝐾𝐴 = 0.5), the trustful-copying bystander 317 
(i.e. 𝐾𝐵 = 1 and 𝑏 = 1) will reduce his preference from 0.75 to 0.61 (Fig. 1a, b). In contrast, 318 
when the direct assessment is less accurate so that the actor’s preference for the high-quality 319 
female is 0.65, the same level of deception is enough to make a trustful bystander reverse his 320 
preference and show a 0.71 mating preference for the low-quality female (Fig. 1c,d).  321 
 322 
<H2>Fertilization success and cheating costs 323 
Although uncertainty in female quality assessment is a key parameter of the game, we start by 324 
considering the ideal case, in which there is no uncertainty and, thus, no possibility of 325 
deception. Since deception is fully ineffective, the actor is forced to play the ‘honest’ strategy, 326 
𝐾𝐴 = 0. The bystander’s best reply to this strategy depends on his fertilization success (𝛿𝜑). 327 
When 𝛿𝜑 < 𝜇𝐿/𝜇𝐻, the bystander maximizes his payoffs by mating with the low-quality 328 
female. Under this condition, the bystander will adopt the ‘trustful-not-copying’ strategy 329 
(𝐾𝐵 = 1; 𝑏 = 0), which makes him use the public information against the female preferred by 330 
the actor. When 𝛿𝜑 > 𝜇𝐿/𝜇𝐻, in contrast, the bystander maximizes his payoffs by mating 331 
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with the high-quality female even if she has already mated with the actor. In this case, the 332 
bystander will adopt the ‘trustful-copying’ strategy (𝐾𝐵 = 1; 𝑏 = 1), which strongly penalizes 333 
the actor. 334 
 335 
Now, we introduce uncertainty into the game. In Fig. 2, we show the effect of the bystander’s 336 
fertilization success and of the actor’s cheating costs on the Nash equilibrium strategies, under 337 
a condition of low (𝜎 = 0.7) and high (𝜎 = 3, Fig. 2a, b) uncertainty. In these simulations, 338 
female qualities are kept constant at 𝜇𝐻 = 15 and 𝜇𝐿 = 12 (but see the Python Notebook for 339 
results under different conditions, http://penelope.unito.it/matecopying).  340 
 341 
When assessment uncertainty is low (Fig. 2a, b) and 𝛿𝜑 < 𝜇𝐿/𝜇𝐻, the ‘honest’ actor and the 342 
‘trustful-not-copying’ bystander are still pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In contrast, when 343 
𝛿𝜑 > 𝜇𝐿/𝜇𝐻 the bystander always copies the actor (𝑏 = 1), who, in turn, would benefit by 344 
deceiving the bystander into preferring the low-quality female. However, since uncertainty is 345 
low, deception is ineffective and the costs it imposes on the actor usually exceed the benefits. 346 
Under these conditions, the actor is forced to play the ‘honest’ strategy, the bystander 347 
perceives the actor’s behaviour as fully reliable and the ‘honest-trustful-copying’ strategy is a 348 
pure Nash equilibrium pair. There are, however, a few exceptions, which occur when the 349 
bystander’s fertilization success is extremely high and the costs of cheating very low. Under 350 
these conditions, the game has only mixed equilibrium strategies, in which the actor is no 351 
longer fully honest (0 < ?̅?𝐴
∗ < 1) and the bystander no longer fully trustful (0 < ?̅?𝐵
∗ < 1). 352 
 353 
In Fig. 2c, d, we show the solutions of the game when female quality assessment is highly 354 
uncertain. The ‘honest/trustful-not-copying’ pair of strategies is still a Nash equilibrium, but 355 
only for a fertilization success much lower than 𝜇𝐿/𝜇𝐻. Indeed, the fertilization success 356 
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threshold above which ‘copying’ is the most remunerative strategy for the bystander 357 
decreases with increasing assessment uncertainty: for 𝜎 = 3 the threshold is 𝛿𝜑 ≅ 0.55 (Fig. 358 
2d), for 𝜎 = 4 is 𝛿𝜑 ≅ 0.45,and for 𝜎 = 5 is 𝛿𝜑 ≅ 0.35 (see the Python notebook).  359 
 360 
As explained above, when sperm competition penalizes the bystander, he should adopt the 361 
‘not-copying’ strategy to minimize the risk of mating with an already mated female. If the 362 
bystander knows with certainty which female the actor prefers, then he would be able to 363 
minimize the risks of sperm competition by mating with the disfavoured female. However, 364 
when the uncertainty of quality assessment increases, the actor’s mating preference decreases 365 
and the bystander’s risk of mating with an already mated female increases. For example, if the 366 
honest actor showed a preference for the high-quality female of 𝑀𝐻 = 0.6, the bystander that 367 
adopted the ‘trustful-not-copying’ strategy would show a preference for the low-quality 368 
female of 𝐵𝐿 = 0.62. In this case, there would be a  0.48 probability that the bystander and 369 
the actor mate with the same female and a 0.52 probability that the chosen female is the low-370 
quality one. But, if the bystander cannot prevent sperm competition, then he would do better 371 
trying to compete for the eggs of the high-quality rather than for those of the low-quality 372 
female. For this reason, the threshold from the ‘not-copying’ to the ‘copying’ strategy 373 
decreases when the uncertainty of female quality assessment increases. 374 
 375 
When the bystander switches from the ‘not-copying’ to the ‘copying’ strategy, the actor no 376 
longer benefits from playing honestly, unless the deception costs prevent him from cheating. 377 
In fact, the ‘honest-trustful-copying’ equilibrium pair of strategies is only found when the 378 
costs of cheating are greater than a certain threshold, which increases with the bystander’s 379 
fertilization success. For example, for 𝛿𝜑 = 0.6, there are honest equilibrium pairs only when 380 
𝛾 ≥ 0.5, whereas for 𝛿𝜑 = 0.7 only when  𝛾 ≥ 0.7, and the honesty threshold increases to 381 
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𝛾 = 0.9 for 𝛿𝜑 = 0.8 (Fig. 2c). In all other cases, the game has no pure equilibrium pairs, but 382 
only one or more mixed equilibrium strategies. Under these conditions, deception is more 383 
effective when the cheating costs are high (𝛾 ≥ 0.5) than when they are low. In fact, Fig. 2c, 384 
d shows that the mixed equilibrium strategies of the bystander tend to underestimate the 385 
honesty of the actor (i.e. ?̅?𝐵
∗ > 1 − ?̅?𝐴
∗) when the costs of cheating are low and to overestimate 386 
it (i.e. ?̅?𝐵
∗ < 1 − ?̅?𝐴
∗) when the costs are high. Independent of the costs, however, the level of 387 
deception is always relatively low, being always ?̅?𝐴
∗ < 0.3. For these values of ?̅?𝐴
∗, the 388 
manifested preference of the actor for the highest-quality female is decreased but still higher 389 
than 0.5. Thus, the actor seems more likely to retain honest information than to provide the 390 
bystander with dishonest information. 391 
 392 
<H1>Discussion 393 
When being copied by an eavesdropper imposes a cost on the male making a mating decision, 394 
the latter is expected to adjust his behaviour in order to limit or prevent the use of public 395 
information (Nordell & Valone, 1998). However, since these changes in behaviour are likely 396 
to be costly, the behavioural adjustment is expected to make an optimal trade-off between 397 
these two types of costs. Our game-theoretic model has been devised to study this trade-off. 398 
Specifically, the model asks when it pays a courting male to reduce his manifested preference 399 
for the high-quality female in order to decrease the probability that a bystander male will mate 400 
with her. A similar question has been addressed recently by Dubois (2015). In her game, 401 
males can adopt one of four tactics: (1) unselective males, which mate with both high- and 402 
low-quality females indiscriminately; (2) copier males, which use social information, when 403 
available, or mate indiscriminately, when unavailable; (3) selective-insensitive males, which 404 
prefer high- over low-quality females, without changing these preferences in the presence of 405 
an audience; or (4) selective and sensitive males, which prefer high-quality females and 406 
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change their preference in the presence of an audience. The results of the model indicate that 407 
the four tactics form a mixed equilibrium strategy when last-male sperm precedence is strong, 408 
the cost of female assessment large and the risk of eavesdropping high. The selective-409 
sensitive tactic, however, is never a pure strategy.  410 
Our model differs from Dubois’s model (2015) both in the assumptions and in the 411 
methodology and derives, to a large extent, different results. The main methodological 412 
difference is that our model is based on the computational mechanisms and rules of mating 413 
decisions (Castellano, 2009, 2010). The computational mechanisms (1) explain how the 414 
decision maker processes private and public information, (2) are part of the assumptions of 415 
the model and, consequently, (3) act as a constraint on the set of possible behavioural 416 
strategies. Following the ‘behavioural gambit’ approach (Fawcett, Hamblin, & Giraldeau, 417 
2013), Dubois’s model considers the alternative strategies as independent phenotypes, which 418 
can be interpreted as either polymorphic traits in the population or plastic traits at the 419 
individual level. Given these tactics, the solution of the game is the set of phenotypic 420 
frequencies that are evolutionarily stable. In contrast, in our model, the alternative tactics are 421 
not independent traits, but the expression of the same decisional mechanism. Our model 422 
explains behavioural variation in terms of variation in the parameters that govern the 423 
computational mechanisms and it assumes that selection acts on these parameters (Castellano, 424 
2009, 2015; McNamara & Houston, 2009). We think that this approach might help to capture 425 
the very essence of the biological problem under study by favouring a close integration of 426 
decision mechanism and behaviour function.  427 
Our model identified three main factors that are expected to affect the strategic manipulation 428 
of public information: (1) the strength of the conflict between the eavesdropping and the 429 
eavesdropped males; (2) the manipulative potential of the eavesdropped male, which depends 430 
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on the intrinsic value of public information; and (3) the cost of public information 431 
manipulation. 432 
 433 
<H2>The strength of the conflict 434 
The most important factor that affects the strategic use of public information is the strength of 435 
the conflict between the individual that provides public information (the actor) and the 436 
individual that can use this information (the bystander) (Nordell & Valone, 1998; Valone, 437 
2007). In our model, the strength of the conflict depended on (1) the difference in fertilization 438 
success between the actor and the bystander and (2) the difference in quality between the two 439 
contended resources (females).  440 
When the fertilization success of the bystander is lower than the ratio between the low- and 441 
the high-quality females, there is no conflict between the actor and the bystander, because 442 
both maximize their reproductive success by choosing different females: the actor, which has 443 
the priority in mating decision, will do best by choosing the high-quality female, whereas the 444 
bystander will do best by choosing the low-quality female. In this case, public information 445 
might be better seen as being about the costs, rather than the benefits, for the bystander of 446 
choosing the high-quality resource: the actor benefits from providing public information 447 
about these costs and the bystander benefits from exploiting the public information provided 448 
by the actor. This is what has been observed in a context of interspecific competition for food 449 
between eusocial stingless bees that eavesdrop on recruitment signals of other species to 450 
guide their foraging strategy (Lichtenberg, Zivin, Hrncir, & Nieh, 2014). Since eavesdroppers 451 
may fight to access the food, they have been observed to avoid more conspicuous signals 452 
because they indicate higher competitive costs. Analogously, our model suggests that, when 453 
the bystander has a low fertilization success (i.e. when last-male sperm precedence is weak 454 
20 
 
and/or female remating probability is low), he should do better by reversing rather than by 455 
copying the actor’s preference. 456 
Interestingly, the model also suggests that uncertainty in female quality assessment affects the 457 
strength of the conflict. In fact, other things being equal, high assessment uncertainty reduces 458 
the strength of the actor’s preference and hence the intrinsic value of public information. 459 
However, when the bystander is uncertain about the choice of actor, our model predicted that 460 
his optimal strategy is to use public information as an indication of expected benefits of 461 
copying, rather than of expected costs. In fact, if uncertainty makes sperm competition 462 
unavoidable, the bystander should do better by competing for the high- than for the low-463 
quality resources. Although in our game the actor could only reduce but not increase his 464 
perceived preferences (i.e. 𝐾𝐴 was forced to vary between 0 and 1), we can predict that if he 465 
has a strong sperm competition advantage over the bystander, then he would be favoured by 466 
exaggerating his manifested preferences (i.e. 𝐾𝐴 > 1). In this way, the risk of sperm 467 
competition would decrease and both the actor and the bystander would benefit. Indeed, as 468 
suggested by Lichtenberg et al. (2014), when the public information is about the costs of 469 
accessing a resource, both signallers and eavesdroppers benefit from the increase in the 470 
information quality (i.e. an increase in signal conspicuousness is expected). 471 
When the fertilization success of the bystander is greater than the ratio between the low- and 472 
the high-quality females, the conflict between the bystander and the actor is strong, because 473 
both benefit from choosing the high-quality female. In this case, the model predicted mixed 474 
equilibrium strategies, with partially unreliable actors and partially untrusting bystanders. At 475 
the equilibrium, both the actual and the perceived reliability of public information depended 476 
on the potential benefits and on the expected costs of its manipulation (see below). 477 
 478 
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<H2>The intrinsic value of public information 479 
The potential benefits obtained by manipulating public information depend on its intrinsic 480 
value. Our model assumed that the male mating preference between two females is equivalent 481 
to the posterior probability that one female is perceived of higher quality than the other. 482 
Consistent with the optimality approach of the normative models in behavioural ecology 483 
(Parker & Smith, 1990), our model also assumed that posterior probabilities are computed by 484 
integrating direct evidence with priors, as explained by the Bayes’ principle (Castellano, 485 
2009, 2015). According to our model, the intrinsic value of public information (i.e. the 486 
manipulative potential of the actor) is therefore the effect of priors on the posterior 487 
probabilities. This effect is strong only when the value of private information (acquired by the 488 
direct assessment of female qualities) is low. For example, if the direct assessment provides 489 
no information (i.e. 𝑃(𝑥|𝐻) = 0.5), then the posterior and the prior probabilities coincide and, 490 
thus, the manipulative potential of the actor is maximum. High intrinsic values of public 491 
information might be observed either (1) when the direct assessment is inaccurate and the 492 
alternatives cannot be effectively discriminated from each other or (2) when the direct 493 
assessment is accurate but costly to carry out. 494 
In our game, when the difference in quality between the two females and the assessment 495 
accuracy were both high, then the effect of public information on the bystander’s mating 496 
preferences was low. In contrast, when the difference in quality was small and the assessment 497 
accuracy was low, the value of public information was potentially high. Empirical evidence 498 
supports this prediction. For example, in species in which females use public information in 499 
mate choice, ‘copying’ occurs more commonly when males have similar quality (Dugatkin, 500 
1992; Dugatkin & Godin, 1992), than when they show a large difference in quality (Brooks, 501 
1996; Dugatkin, 1996a). Furthermore, inexperienced (e.g. young) females tend to copy the 502 
choice of more experienced females (Dugatkin & Godin, 1993).  When males do not provide 503 
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resources for reproduction or when these resources are not limited (Berglund, Magnhagen, 504 
Bisazza, Konig, & Huntingford, 1993), there is unlikely to be any substantial cost for the 505 
female whose choice is copied. In contrast, model males pay a cost of being copied. The 506 
results of our model suggests that the manipulation of public information is more likely to 507 
occur when the difference in quality between the mating options is small. However, under 508 
these conditions, the benefits of manipulation are also necessarily low. 509 
The intrinsic value of public information also depends on the accuracy of mate quality 510 
assessment. This, in turn, will affect the relative costs of using private and public information. 511 
When private information is more costly to acquire than public information, it might be 512 
beneficial to make a quick and inaccurate evaluation of the alternatives and to base the mating 513 
decision mainly on public information. For example, in agonistic interactions, the direct 514 
assessment of the competitive value of rivals might be costly, because it exposes the decision 515 
maker to the risk of fighting. In these cases, the decision maker should trust the ‘reputation’ of 516 
the opponent, rather than directly assess his value (Valone, 2007). In a mate choice context, 517 
this is similar to what may be observed in species in which cryptically coloured females that 518 
assess directly conspicuous mates expose themselves to the risk of being predated (Gibson & 519 
Bachman, 1992; Pocklington & Dill, 1995). When the predation risk associated with direct 520 
mate assessment is high, female mate choice copying is more likely to evolve. In males, in 521 
contrast, it is unlikely that the costs of assessing female quality are so high that they would 522 
exceed either the costs of copying or the benefits of accurate evaluations.  523 
 524 
<H2>The costs of manipulating public information 525 
The results of our model suggest that the actor’s strategic manipulation of public 526 
information may evolve when the conflict between the actor and the bystander is so 527 
strong that it pays the bystander to copy the actor’s choice and the intrinsic value of 528 
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public information is high. In our game, this was represented by a reduction in the actor’s 529 
manifested preference for high-quality females in the presence of an audience. However, 530 
a reduction in courtship effort is likely to decrease the actor’s attractiveness and his 531 
probability of mating with the high-quality female. The results of our model indicated 532 
that the higher the manipulation costs the higher the reliability of public information at 533 
equilibrium. If, in contrast, the actor pays no costs for manipulating public information 534 
(i.e. his probability of mating with the high-quality female is not reduced), his best move 535 
is to make his manifested preference for the high-quality female unreliable, so that the 536 
bystander no longer benefits from using public information. The manipulation costs, 537 
thus, can prevent the complete corruption of public information in social networks and 538 
promote mixed equilibrium strategies that make actors only partially reliable and 539 
bystanders only partially trustful. 540 
 541 
<H2>Conclusions 542 
Our model showed that when being eavesdropped on is costly, an animal is expected to 543 
plastically adjust its behaviour to reduce the amount of public information that is available to 544 
the unintended audience. However, unless the costs of being eavesdropped on are extremely 545 
high and those of manipulating public information extremely low, such an audience-mediated 546 
plasticity is unlikely to be so pronounced that it results in an effective manipulation of the 547 
audience. In other words, males are not expected to cheat about their real mating preference to 548 
deceive bystanders, unless under very limited (and extreme) conditions. The results of our 549 
model conflict with the empirical evidence that male poeciliids reverse their mating 550 
preference in the presence of a male audience (but see Callander, Backwell, & Jennions, 2012 551 
for contrasting results; Plath, Blum, et al., 2008; Plath, Richter, et al., 2008; Ziege et al., 552 
2009). We argue that this audience effect may therefore have alternative functional 553 
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explanations. For example, males may plastically modify their perceived preferences for the 554 
high-quality female to reduce the costs associated with direct, precopulatory, male–male 555 
competition (Auld, Jeswiet, & Godin, 2015; Mautz & Jennions, 2011; Plath, Richter, et al., 556 
2008). While clearly the audience effect can be interpreted as a male strategy to maximize his 557 
reproductive success when rival males are present, the two interpretations are radically 558 
different. The deception hypothesis rests on the assumption that the audience effect does not 559 
affect mate choice, but only the manifested preferences. The alternative hypothesis, which 560 
could be named the ‘flexible decision’ hypothesis, assumes that both mating preferences and 561 
mating decisions are flexibly adjusted to the social environment in which mate choice is 562 
carried out. A large difference in body size between the actor and the bystander should not 563 
influence the actor’s behaviour under the deception hypothesis (Plath, Richter, et al., 2008), 564 
whereas it should have a large effect if the actor’s strategy aims at reducing the costs of 565 
aggressive male–male interactions. Similar predictions may be made for the difference in 566 
male ornamentation. In contrast, the deception hypothesis predicts a larger audience effect 567 
when the actor can choose between females that are very different in quality, whereas a male 568 
may decide to pay the costs of an aggressive interaction with the bystander, and hence keep 569 
his initial preference, if the audience effect is mainly driven by the costs of aggressive 570 
interactions. More empirical studies on the effects of social environments on both mating 571 
preferences and mating decisions (Mautz & Jennions, 2011) will be necessary to provide 572 
insights into the functional role of the audience effect.  573 
 574 
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 755 
Appendix 756 
The model assumes that a male would choose to court (and eventually to mate with) a female 757 
if the posterior probability that this female is of high quality is greater than 0.5. Here, we 758 
derive the value of perceived female quality (), above which the female is accepted as an 759 
appropriate mate and below which she is rejected.  760 
Let 𝑃(𝐻) and 𝑃(𝐿) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐻) be the prior probabilities that the assessed female is of either 761 
high or low quality, respectively.  762 
From Bayes’s theorem, it derives that the posterior probability that the assessed female is of 763 
high quality is: 764 
 𝑃(𝐻|𝑥) =
𝑃(𝑥|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝑥|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)+𝑃(𝑥|𝐿)𝑃(𝐿)
,  765 
and the posterior probability that she is of low quality is: 766 
𝑃(𝐿|𝑥) =
𝑃(𝑥|𝐿)𝑃(𝐿)
𝑃(𝑥|𝐻)𝑃(𝐻)+𝑃(𝑥|𝐿)𝑃(𝐿)
. 767 
Let ℎ(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎
𝑒
−
(𝑥−𝜇𝐻)
2
2𝜎2 and 𝑙(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎
𝑒
−
(𝑥−𝜇𝐿)
2
2𝜎2  be the two conditional probability 768 
density functions 𝑃(𝑥|𝐻) and 𝑃(𝑥|𝐿), respectively.  769 
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We define with  the value of 𝑥 where 𝑃(𝐻|) = 𝑃(𝐿|) = 0.5.  770 
Since 
ℎ()
𝑙()
=
𝑃(𝐿)
𝑃(𝐻)
,  771 
 =
𝜇𝐻+𝜇𝐿
2
+
𝜎2
𝜇𝐻−𝜇𝐿
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃(𝐿)
𝑃(𝐻)
). 772 
If the choosing male uses only private information (i.e. 𝑃(𝐻) = 𝑃(𝐿) = 0.5), then  = 
0
=773 
𝜇𝐻+𝜇𝐿
2
. If he integrates private and public information and if public information is honest (i.e. 774 
𝑃(𝐻) > 𝑃(𝐿)), then  < 
0
 and the male’s preferences for the high-quality female increase. 775 
Finally, if the male uses dishonest public information (i.e. 𝑃(𝐻) < 𝑃(𝐿)), then  > 
0
 and his 776 
preferences for the high-quality female decrease.  777 
 778 
 779 
  780 
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Figure Captions 781 
 782 
Figure 1. The effectiveness of the actor’s deception depends on the bystander’s uncertainty in 783 
the direct assessment of female quality. In (a) and (b), the uncertainty is relatively low 784 
(𝜎 = 1.5
𝜇𝐻−𝜇𝐿
2
). In (a), the bystander uses only private information. The two normal curves 785 
are the conditional probability distributions of the perceived qualities when the female is of 786 
either low  (dotted red curve, 𝑃(𝑥|𝐿)) or high quality (dotted blue curve, 𝑃(𝑥|𝐻))). The 787 
bystander preference for the high-quality female is the cumulative probability of perceiving 788 
the female above the blue threshold ( =
𝜇𝐻+𝜇𝐿
2
) and is 𝐵𝐻 = 0.75 (i.e. the integral 789 
represented by the blue area). In (b), the bystander also uses public information by observing 790 
the actor’s courtship behaviour. The actor, however, is assumed to deceive (𝐾𝐴 = 0.5)  so that 791 
his manifested preference is 𝑀𝐻 = 0.75(1 − 𝐾𝐴) = 0.375. The red and blue solid curves are, 792 
respectively, 𝑃(𝑥|𝐿) ∗ 𝑃(𝐿) and 𝑃(𝑥|𝐻) ∗ 𝑃(𝐻). The actor’s deception decreases the 793 
bystander’s preference for the high-quality female because it increases the quality threshold 794 
() above which 𝑃(𝐻|𝑥) > 0.5 (i.e. the orange line, where the solid red and the solid blue 795 
curves intersect). Under these conditions, the bystander’s preference is 𝐵𝐻 = 0.61 (the blue 796 
surface). In (c) and (d), the uncertainty is higher than in (a) and (b), being 𝜎 = 2.5
𝜇𝐻−𝜇𝐿
2
. In 797 
(c), the bystander uses only private information and his preference for the high-quality female 798 
is 𝐵𝐻 = 0.65 (blue surface). In (d), the bystander uses public information and the actor 799 
deceives (𝐾𝐴 = 0.5), as in (b). In this case, however, deception is much more effective than in 800 
(b) and the bystander’s preference for the high-quality female is 𝐵𝐻 = 0.29, which is less than 801 
half the preference manifested when using private information only. 802 
 803 
Figure 2. The effect of the fertilization success and the cheating cost on the equilibrium 804 
strategies of the actor and the bystander. The yellow gradient is associated with the ‘copying’ 805 
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strategies (i.e. 𝐾𝑂 = 1) and the green gradient with the ‘not-copying’ strategies (i.e. 𝐾𝑂 = 0). 806 
Plain yellow and plain green in the Actor panels ((a) and (c)) correspond to the honest 807 
strategy (𝐾𝐴 = 0), whereas in the Bystander panels ((c) and (d)) plain yellow corresponds to 808 
the ‘trustful-not-copying’ strategy (𝐾𝑂 = 1 and 𝑏 = 0) and plain green to the ‘trustful-809 
copying’ strategy. Blue indicates the absence of pure Nash equilibrium strategies and the 810 
tonality of blue is proportional to the honesty (for the Actor) or the perceived reliability (for 811 
the Bystander) of the strategy (black dishonesty or unreliability). See 812 
http://penelope.unito.it/matecopying for further details. 813 
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